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In this paper, we investigate the relationship between foreign aid 
and growth using recently developed sample splitting methods that 
allow us to simultaneously uncover evidence for the existence of 
heterogeneity and nonlinearity. We also address model uncertainty in 
the context of these methods. We find some evidence that aid may 
have heterogeneous effects on growth across two growth regimes 
defined by ethnolinguistic fractionalization. However, when we 
account for model uncertainty, we find no evidence to suggest that 
the relationship between aid and growth is nonlinear. In fact, our 
results suggest that the partial effect of aid on growth is likely 
to be weakly negative. In this sense, our findings suggest that aid 
is potentially counterproductive to growth with outcomes not meeting 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the most controversial debates in the empirical growth literature 
with big policy implications is whether foreign aid is beneficial to a country's 
economic growth. In an influential paper, Burnside and Dollar (2000) examine the 
effect of aid, as measured by the ratio of the sum of grants and the grant 
equivalents of official loans in constant prices to real GDP (or, Effective 
Development Assistance (EDA)), on growth. Using standard cross-country panel 
growth regressions that include an interaction term of aid with a policy index, 
they find that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries as 
long as these countries have sound macroeconomic policies. The policy 
implication of this finding was straightforward. Policy makers at international 
aid agencies could now argue that development assistance can contribute to 
poverty reduction in countries with good policy environments. 
On the other hand, this finding has sparked an industry of mainly 
empirical papers trying to examine the sensitivity of Burnside and Dollar's 
results to model specification, alternative sets of included/excluded variables, 
and different data series. Some of the most notable papers include Guillaumont 
and Chauvet (2001), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Collier and Dehn (2001), Collier and 
Dollar (2002, 2004), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Easterly (2003), Easterly, 
Levine, and Roodman (2004), Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004), Roodman (2004), 
and Rajan and Subramanian (2005a,b). Some of these papers confirm the main 
finding of Burnside and Dollar; i.e., that aid is effective only in countries 
with good policies, while others find the results fragile to the addition of 
particular variables. 
One problem that the literature on aid and growth has been dealing with is 
the problem of how to model heterogeneity and/or nonlinearities in growth 
analyses. Typically, what has been done is to treat this issue in an ad hoc way 
by including squares and interaction terms for aid, policy, and other growth 
variables. The unsystematic, ad hoc nature as to how specific choices are made 
over which nonlinearities/heterogeneity to include and which to leave out, 
however, leaves much to be desired. For instance, there is no good reason for 
only including an interaction term between aid and policy and not the square of 
aid or even both in the model. Why not also include an interaction term between 
policy and institutions? In fact, several new growth theories such as Azariadis 
and Drazen (1990) and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2002) suggest that the cross-
country growth process is highly nonlinear. 
To make things worse, as suggested by Brock and Durlauf (2001), new growth 
theories are inherently open-ended. By theory open-endedness, Brock and Durlauf 
refer to the fact that typically the a priori statement that a particular theory 
of growth is relevant does not preclude other theories of growth from also being 
relevant. Growth models typically do not provide much guidance as to the exact 
specification in which growth determinants should enter the growth equation as 
well. Brock and Durlauf point out that taken together, the combination of theory 
and specification uncertainty (what they refer to collectively as model 
uncertainty) potentially renders coefficient estimates of interest to be 
“fragile”. The potential fragility of coefficient estimates under model 
uncertainty is important because it implies that findings on the relationship 
between aid and growth, which do not properly account for model uncertainty, may 
be non-robust. For instance, the finding of a nonlinear relationship between aid 
and growth may, in fact, be just a manifestation of some other unaccounted 
misspecification due to omitted variables or even due to unaccounted 
heterogeneity and/or nonlinearities with respect to other growth determinants. 
Our point is that strong a priori assumptions on the appropriate specification 
of growth determinants and functional form of the model are hard to justify. 
Nevertheless, while there is little agreement over the exact nature of 
nonlinearities and heterogeneity in the growth literature, there is a growing   2
consensus that, given that we think such nonlinearities/heterogeneity exists, 
they may potentially be fruitfully modeled using empirical tools that emphasize 
pattern recognition (see Durlauf (2003)). Sample splitting and threshold 
regression methods and their derivatives are important constituents of such 
tools. For instance, Durlauf and Johnson (1995) employed a classification and 
regression tree method (CART; see Breiman, Friedman, Olsen, and Stone (1984)) to 
sort countries based on initial per capita income and initial literacy rates. 
They interpret their findings as evidence in favor of the theory of poverty 
traps of Azariadis and Drazen (1992). 
In this paper we employ recently developed sample splitting methods to 
systematically uncover the robust relationship between aid and growth. Sample 
splitting methods such as threshold regression and regression trees allow for 
increased flexibility in functional form and at the same time are not as 
susceptible to curse of dimensionality problems as nonparametric methods. Unlike 
parametric models with polynomial terms (squares, interactions, etc), sample 
splitting methods are parsimonious. More importantly, these methods are 
structurally interpretable as they endogenously sort the data, on the basis of 
some threshold determinants, into groups of countries each of which obeys the 
same model (i.e., multiple growth regimes). Other notable applications of sample 
splitting methods in growth include Tan (2006) who use an improved regression 
tree algorithm to CART (GUIDE; see Loh (2002)) and Masanjala and Papageorgiou 
(2004) who employ threshold regression (TR; see Hansen (1996, 2000) and Gonzalo 
and Pitarakis (2002)). 
A major problem associated with the sample splitting methods that have 
been employed so far in the literature, however, is the sequential nature of the 
splitting process. By this we mean that choices of threshold variables and split 
values made in initial sample splits are never revised as the number of splits 
increases. Hence, any mistake made at the earlier stages of the process is 
propagated to the splits below. The result is that the classification of 
observations into regimes can be unstable. Small changes in the data result in 
large changes to the threshold or “tree” structure (see Hastie, Tibshirani, and 
Friedman (2001) and also Hong, Wang, and Zhang (2005)). 
To be clear this is not an issue of statistical inference but rather it 
has to do with the qualitative nature of threshold variables. It is one thing to 
define a 95% confidence interval for a (real-valued) parameter as [0.3,0.8] and 
quite another thing to say that a 95% confidence interval for the discrete-
valued parameter associated with the choice of threshold variable includes two 
variables, initial per capita income and property rights. In the former case the 
threshold effect is consistent with theories of poverty traps and development 
while in the latter it says something about the importance of economic 
institutions in posing barriers to growth. 
A contribution of this paper is to employ a simultaneous sample split 
method, Bayesian tree regression (BTREED; see Chipman, George, and McCulloch 
(1998, 2002)) to deal with this problem. BTREED is a non-sequential regression 
tree procedure that generates the best tree of every size. Thus, it is less 
likely to suffer from some of the consequences (e.g., tree instability issues) 
of sequential sample splitting methods such as TR or CART. Nevertheless, we 
compare our results with TR since this method provides formal asymptotic theory 
for the construction of confidence intervals for the threshold estimates. 
A second key methodological contribution of this paper is to move the 
discussion away from model selection towards model averaging in the context of 
nonlinear (and, in particular, sample split or tree) models. As Cohen-Cole, 
Durlauf, and Rondina (2006) note, there has not so far been a systematic 
investigation of model uncertainty and nonlinearities in the growth context. 
This paper can be viewed as a first attempt towards this ambitious goal. In   3
order to achieve this, we exploit a new statistical learning methodology, 
Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART)
1. Specifically, the idea is to 
generate a large number of trees, each of which is a bad fit for the data as a 
whole (i.e., a “weak learner”), but gives insight into a small part of the 
underlying data generation process, so that, taken together, the “sum-of-trees” 
provides a good estimate of the underlying process. Also, in contrast to single-
tree methods, there is no need in BART to condition upon a particular choice of 
slope covariates and threshold variables. Rather inference is obtained by 
averaging the sum-of-tree draws from the BART posterior distribution. We view 
our methodological contribution in this paper as an extension of the standard 
model averaging exercises recently applied in the empirical growth literature 
(see Brock and Durlauf (2001), Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001), and Sala-i-
Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) among others). 
We find some evidence in the BTREED and TR results that aid may have 
heterogeneous effects on growth across two growth regimes defined by 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization. In particular, countries that belong to a 
growth regime characterized by levels of ethnolinguistic fractionalization above 
a threshold value experience a negative partial relationship between aid and 
growth, while those in the regime with ethnolinguistic fractionalization below 
the threshold experience no growth effects from aid at all. We also find that 
countries in the regime with higher levels of ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
experience, on average, lower growth rates than countries in the lower 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization regime. Nevertheless, we do find substantial 
tree instability in our sample split exercises so that attempts to characterize 
the typology of these growth regimes with a high degree of certainty remains 
elusive. There is evidence that the typology of these regimes may be 
alternatively well-characterized by property rights institutions or 
macroeconomic policies such as the level of inflation, and not just 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The data simply cannot be certain. 
Our BART results are therefore particularly valuable given the high degree 
of uncertainty generated by tree instabiliity. Here, we find very little 
evidence to suggest that the relationship between aid and growth is nonlinear 
for the set of developing countries who are aid recipients. Overall, our results 
suggest that the partial effect of aid on growth is very likely to be negative 
although we cannot reject the hypothesis that aid has no effect on growth. In 
this sense, our findings suggest that aid is potentially counterproductive to 
growth with outcomes not meeting the expectations of donors. We are therefore 
sympathetic to the positions of work such as Easterly, Levine, and Roodman 
(2004) and Rajan and Subramanian (2005a) which are generally pessimistic about 
the potential contributions of aid to improving economic performance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we 
briefly describe our econometric methodology, which includes Bayesian tree 
regression (BTREED), threshold regression (TR), and Bayesian Additive Regression 
Trees (BART). In Section 3 we describe our data. Section 4 presents our findings 
and Section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1 BART is closely related to so-called “ensemble” methods such as random forests 
(Breiman (2001)), bagging (Breiman (1996)), and, most directly, boosting 
(Friedman (2001)) in the machine learning literature. Ensemble methods have been 
shown to have extremely good out-of-sample prediction performance besting even 
those of neural networks (see, in particular, Friedman (2001) and Hastie, 
Tibshirani, and Friedman (2001)). Unlike the above-mentioned machine learning 
methods, however, BART is not defined purely by an algorithm, but, instead, by a 
statistical model within the Bayesian framework.}, developed by Chipman, George, 
and McCulloch (2002).   4
2. Econometric Methodology 
 
We conduct our analysis of the relationship between aid and growth using a 
generalized sample split model that can be defined as follows:  
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where i indexes the observations (i.e., countries) and j indexes the b growth 
regimes.  i g  is the average growth rate of per capita income for country i 
across a time period.  i h  is the foreign aid proxy (i.e., the variable of 
interest). We distinguish between two sets of growth determinants. The k-
dimensional vector x  denotes the set of slope covariates while the p-
dimensional vector  z  denotes threshold variables. 
The set of slope covariates includes the usual Solow regressors, that is, 
the logarithms of the average rates of physical and human capital accumulation, 
the logarithm of average population growth rate plus 0.05, and the logarithm of 
initial per capita income. We also include variables from a wide range of new 
growth theories including macroeconomic policy, geography, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, political institutions, and property rights institutions. 
Most of the covariates can also be viewed as threshold variables. For instance, 
theories of development that emphasize threshold externalities such as Azariadis 
and Drazen (1992) suggest that initial per capita income may act as a threshold 
variable. Alternatively, theories that emphasize economic “take-off” (e.g., 
Galor and Weil (2000), Galor and Moav (2002), and Galor (2005)) suggest an 
important role for fundamental growth determinants (such as geography and 
institutions) in driving growth divergence
2. To be as agnostic as possible a 
slope covariate is also a threshold variable as long as it makes sense. 
To this end, we specify in our sample split exercises that, with the 
exception of the factors of accumulation and population growth rates (which are 
period averages), all slope covariates (including aid) are also threshold 
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We can visualize an example of a tree or threshold regression estimation 
procedure using Figure 1 which is due to Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 
(2001). Here, the set of observations is partitioned into five regimes,  15 ,..., R R , 
defined by the interaction between variables  1 x  and  2 x . In this example, the 
model in (1) is modified to be a piece-wise constant model so that a local 
average is estimated within each regime. The model we use to analyze the effect 
                                                 
2 “The timing of the “take-off” may differ significantly across countries and 
regions due to historical accidents, as well as variation in geographical, 
cultural, social and institutional factors, trade patterns, colonial status, and 
public policy that have affected the relationship between human capital 
formation and technological progress [Galor, 2005, p. 80]”.   5
of aid on growth will be inkeeping with (1); i.e., it will be a piece-wise 
linear model. That is, we would replace each “step” in Figure 1 with a plane in 
each growth regime which slope is determined by the coefficients to the local 
augmented neoclassical growth model defined by (1). 
It is worth noting the generality of (1). If we ignore the effects of  z  
on growth; that is, if we specify, a priori, a single growth regime, then we are 
back to the canonical growth regressions of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and 
Barro (1996). However, as pointed out by Brock and Durlauf (2001), such a 
formulation ignores prior knowledge regarding the existence of heterogeneity 
across country units. That is, it ignores the possibility that the effect of the 
right-hand side covariates on growth may differ systematically across groups of 
countries. Brock and Durlauf explore a special case of (1) to study the robust 
heterogeneous effects of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on growth. In their 
paper, the number of regimes b is trivially fixed to two as their threshold 
variable is a single dummy variable for Sub-Saharan Africa. Given the binary 
nature of the dummy variable there is no need to estimate a threshold parameter 
and hence the classical inference is still valid
3. In contrast, our methodology 
enables us to have multiple regimes and multiple threshold variables. This is 
very important in our context given the large number of growth determinants that 
can act as threshold variables. What is more, the number of regimes b is not 
pre-specified, but instead is endogenously determined.  
One way to estimate (1) is to use the threshold regression methodology of 
Hansen (2000). At each stage of the sample splitting, we carry out Hansen's test 
to see whether the sample should be split. If so, we choose the best (in the 
sense of minimizing sum of squared errors) threshold variable, associated 
threshold value estimate, and the set of regression estimates for Θ . The same 
procedure is then applied iteratively to each of the two subsequent subsamples. 
This “tree growing” procedure stops when either the null of no-split fails to be 
rejected, or the number of observations in the (sub-)sample falls below a pre-
determined minimum value. It is worth noting that TR bears deep similarities to 
the classification and regression trees (CART) method of Breiman, Friedman, 
Olsen, and Stone (1984). The added advantage of using threshold regression as 
opposed to CART is that the statistical inference
4 for both the threshold and 
the regression slopes has been well developed by Hansen (2000). 
Its primary weakness, however, lies in the instability of trees to small 
perturbations in the data as well as in the way that variables are defined. It 
has been well-documented that small changes in the data can lead to very 
different threshold variables, threshold values, and even number of regimes 
being selected by sample splitting methods (see, Hastie, Tibshirani, and 
Friedman (2001) and also Hong, Wang, and Zhang (2005)). A major reason for the 
instability of trees is due to the sequential nature of typical sample splitting 
algorithms. That is, the tree building method does not “update” the tree as it 
gets bigger. Therefore, it may be that as the tree gets bigger, the previously 
selected threshold variables and split values in the “upper” parts of the tree 
(i.e., the initial sample splits) are no longer optimal. We should note that Bai 
                                                 
3 However, this is not true anymore when the threshold variable is not binary 
and we need to estimate a threshold parameter because the threshold parameter is 
not identified under the null. Hansen (2000) shows that the inference is non-
standard and develops an asymptotic theory for both the threshold parameter and 
the regression slopes including a method to construct asymptotic confidence 
intervals for the former. 
 
4 It should be noted that Hansen (2000) only claims the validity of these 
results for the single threshold (i.e., two-regime) case, even though he has 
shown examples of proceeding with these tests iteratively beyond this case.   6
(1999) had suggested an alternative method for getting around the sequential 
nature of traditional threshold regression models. He calls this method 
“repartitioning”. The idea is to revise upper parts of the tree once lower parts 
of the tree are estimated. However, we found the practical implementation of 
repartitioning to be computationally expensive and quickly lost computational 
tractability even when the tree size was only moderately large. This led us to 
consider instead Bayesian tree regression (BTREED) developed by Chipman, George, 
and McCulloch (1998, 2002). 
BTREED is not a sequential splitting method. Instead, what BTREED does is to 
search through trees of all sizes (i.e., the (final) number of regimes) and then 
locate the tree with the highest evidentiary weight for each size. Specifically, 
it employs MCMC to stochastically search over the posterior distribution of 
trees for high posterior probability trees. We then select the final tree using 
BIC. Because each of these trees (no matter the size) is generated 
probabilistically at every stage of tree building, we do not have the situation, 
as we do with sequential splitting methods such as TR, where “upper” portions of 
the tree are never revised even as we vary (increase) the size of trees
5; see 
Chipman, George, and McCulloch (2002). 
Nevertheless, we should note that BTREED, like TR, is still ultimately a 
model selection algorithm. Both sample split methods seek to present one tree as 
the best device for summarizing the relationship between growth and the set of 
growth determinants out of the forest of possible trees. While engaging in such 
model selection has advantages --- for instance, it allows us to present a 
structurally interpretable typology (i.e., tree diagram) for relating aid to 
growth --- this strategy ignores the evidentiary weight associated with 
alternative trees. Cohen-Cole, Durlauf, and Rondina (2006) have suggested that, 
even in the context of nonlinear models, researchers should still attempt to 
report robust estimates of relationships that take into account alternatives to 
the chosen or benchmark model. We pursue this suggestion in this paper. That is, 
we attempt to combine the evidentiary weight on the effect of aid on growth 
across a large number of tree models. 
To do so, we employ a new methodology due to Chipman, George, and 
McCulloch (2005) known as Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART). More 
precisely, we do not condition on a particular choice of slope covariates and 
threshold variables but rather inference is performed by averaging posterior 
information across a large number of tree models in order to flexibly estimate 
the average effect of a variable of interest on the dependent variable. 
Formally, if we define  ( ) ,, ii i i wh x z = , then we can write the growth model 
(1) as  
 
( ) ii i gf wε = +       (2) 
 
where  ()
2 |0 , ii wN ε σ ∼  and  () ( ) | ii i f wE g w = . Then BART provides a way to estimate 
(1) by combining information across tree models drawn from the posterior 
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5 In fact, key steps in BTREED's stochastic tree building algorithm; i.e., 
“swap” and “change” split decisions (see Chipman, George, and McCulloch (1998, 
2002)), are in the spirit of Bai's “repartitioning”.   7
 
Here, the j-th regime for each of the M trees  m T ,  1,..., mM = , is associated with 
a real parameter  j θ . Hence, any  i w  is associated with one of the  j θ  within each 
tree. Letting  () 12 , ,..., b θ θθ Θ=  where b is the number of regimes in T, a single 
tree model may be denoted by the pair ( ) , T Θ . Let  ( ) ˆ ,, im m fw TΘ  denote the  j θ  
associated with  i w  in the m-th tree. The posterior distribution for tree 
models,  () | mw µ , is given by Bayes rule, 
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so that each weight is the product of the likelihood of the data given a model, 
() | wm µ , and the prior probability for a model,  ( ) m µ . The latter is implicitly 
given by,  
 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( )
11 22
12 1 2 12
1,..., , , , ,..., , ,









   (5) 
 
For computational reasons we follow Chipman et al and assume independence so 
that, 
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BART samples from the above posterior distribution using a Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. The construction of each tree  m T  for  1,..., mM =  
employs precisely the tree-building algorithm of BTREED. However, each tree is 
constrained to be small by appropriately setting the tree priors. The choice of 
parameter priors are also essentially similar to those of BTREED. Specifically, 
they are the normal-inverse gamma conjugate priors for the special case where 
the growth model is constrained to just estimating a constant term  j θ . We refer 
the reader to Chipman, George, and McCulloch (2005) for details. 
For better approximations, we would want to set M to be relatively large. 
In our exercises, we follow Chipman et. al. and set M = 200. Notice that BART is 
greatly more flexible than (1). To see this consider first the case of M = 1, 
then  () 11 1 ,, i fw T Θ  is the conditional mean of  g  given w . However, when M > 1, 
the terminal node parameters are merely components of the conditional mean of  g  
given  w . Furthermore, these terminal node parameters will represent direct and 
indirect effects (interaction terms) depending on sizes of the trees. In the 
special case where every terminal node assignment depends on just a single 
component of w , the sum-of-trees model reduces to a simple additive function of 
splits on the individual components of w . 
To assess the effect of each of the determinants on growth we use 
Friedman's (2001) partial dependence plot. To do so, first rewrite  ( ) f w  as 
() , c f hh  where  c h  is the complement of h  in the set w . To estimate the   8
(partial) effect of $h$ on growth, Friedman suggests that we average out the 
effect of  c h  on growth; i.e.,  
 













fh h p hd h
= ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦
=⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦
=∫
     (7) 
 








f hf h h
N =
= ∑      (8) 
 
where each  c h  for  1,..., in =  is an observation in the data. The above is the 
prediction by BART of the partial dependence of growth rates on h  at each level 
in its support. The pointwise posterior 95% confidence intervals for  ( ) ˆ
h f h  can 
also be easily obtain from its posterior distribution using the 2.5-th and 97.5-
th percentiles of the MCMC draws. 
One weakness that applies to all sample splitting methods is that there 
are almost no results on dealing with endogeneity. A notable exception is Caner 
and Hansen (2004) who develop a two-stage instrumental variable estimation 
procedure for threshold regression when the slope variables are endogenous but 
the threshold variable is exogenous. A more attractive estimator would consider 
the endogeneity of both slope and threshold variables. However, such an 
estimator would require an alternative estimation approach due to the nonlinear 
nature of the endogeneity. Unfortunately, an estimator for the case when both 
the slope and threshold variables are endogenous does not currently exist. 
This lack of results for how to deal with endogeneity is a particularly 
important weakness in our context because we introduce aid as both a slope 
covariate as well as a potential threshold variable in this paper. The reason we 
do so is to capture possible differential impacts of aid on growth for countries 
above or below a threshold level of aid. Such a specification potentially 
describes the position of aid proponents who argue that aid needs to be at a 
high enough level before it has a positive impact on growth. However, by doing 
so endogeneity becomes a potential problem since aid is not randomly assigned to 
recipient countries. Typically, more aid is given to those who are less 
developed leading to potential bias in the estimation of regression coefficients 
because of problems with reverse causality as well as correlation with 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
Another aspect of the problem is that the use of instrumental variables in 
the context of growth may be invalid; see Brock and Durlauf (2001). For an 
instrumental variable of aid to be valid, one has to assume that it is 
uncorrelated with all the omitted growth determinants. However, the inherent 
open-ended nature of growth theories makes this event unlikely. To explain their 
position, Brock and Durlauf considered the paper by Frankel and Romer (1999) on 
trade and growth. Using similar reasoning let us consider here the paper of 
Rajan and Subramanian (2005a). Rajan and Subramanian argue that since aid is 
clearly endogenous, then it is necessary to use instrumental variables to obtain 
consistent estimates for the effect of aid on growth. Their instrumental 
variables include dummies for colonial relationships involving Britain, France, 
Spain and Portugal as well as dummies that indicate whether the donor and   9
recipient are common members of, or signatories to, an Entente or Alliance. 
However, notice that the recent growth literature provides many theories of how 
colonial status may affect institutions. Rajan and Subramanian do not account 
for any of these theories and hence it is plausible that the colonial dummies 
are correlated with the omitted growth determinants (regression error) rendering 
their instrumental variable method invalid. 
In sum, there is no doubt that aid is potentially endogenous. 
Nevertheless, controlling for endogeneity in the context of aid and growth is a 
difficult task mainly for two reasons. First, current estimation procedures of 
sample splitting models are unable to deal with endogeneity in general. Second, 
the open-ended nature of growth theories present unique difficulties for 
researchers arguing for the validity of instruments. For these reasons, this 
paper should be viewed as a step towards getting the facts straight rather than 





We use an unbalanced panel dataset (see Table 4) over two periods 1965-79 
(42 countries) and 1979-94 (56 countries) based on a broad set of cross-country 
growth variables. As discussed in the previous section, the dependent variable 
in (1) is the average growth rate of real per capita GDP corresponding to the 
two periods. The set of explanatory variables includes a time dummy for the time 
period 1979-94 and the canonical Solow variables; i.e., the logarithm of the sum 
of average population growth plus 0.05 for net depreciation, the logarithm of 
the average proportion of real investments (including government) to real GDP, 
the logarithm of years of male secondary and higher school attainment, and the 
logarithm of real per capita GDP for the initial year of the time period. The 
national accounting data used to construct these data series are obtained form 
Penn World Table 6.1 (see, Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002)), while schooling 
data comes from Barro and Lee (2001). 
To proxy foreign aid we use data on Effective Development Assistance (EDA) 
as a share of real GDP constructed by Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004) and 
revised by Roodman (2004). Other studies have also measured aid flows using OECD 
data for net Overseas Development Assistance (net ODA). Net ODA is defined as 
transfers --- essentially, any assistance, save military aid, with a grant 
element of at least 25% --- from a donor minus any repayment during a given 
period. We chose to use EDA data (by Chang, Fernandez-Arias, and Serven (1999)) 
instead of ODA data in thhis paper for the same reason that Easterly et al. 
(2004), Roodman (2004), and others do so. As pointed out by Chang, et. al. the 
net ODA data potentially overstates the level of assistance to recipient 
countries. Instead, they propose to exclude technical assistance, which tend to 
go primarily to consultants instead of governments, and to account for different 
degrees of concessionality in loans. 
The EDA data we employ is the most current version of the panel data used 
in much of the aid-growth literature (see, for instance, Burnside and Dollar 
(2000), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004)). This panel 
data set is available in 5-year periods from 1970-1999. Previously, aid data 
were only available every 4 years. We use the 5-year panel data set to construct 
average measures of EDA for the two sample periods 1965-79 and 1980-94. 
Following the literature on growth and aid we include four macroeconomic 
policy variables. We include the logarithm of inflation rate plus one, the ratio 
of budget surplus to GDP, money supply (M2), and the Sachs-Warner (1995) 
variable measuring openness to trade. It is worth noting that we deviate from 
Burnside and Dollar who include a single measure of economic policies. Burnside 
and Dollar first estimate a growth regression without aid but with all the 
covariates and three indicators of macroeconomic policy --- log (1+inflation),   10
budget balance to GDP, and the Sachs-Warner (1995) variable. Then, they 
construct their policy measure by forming a linear combination of the three 
using the coefficients as weights. We believe that the inclusion of generated 
regressors in the analysis will result in unnecessary biases so we include all 
four variables, instead (see also, Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006)).  
Additionally, we expand the Solow space with fundamental determinants of 
economic growth that include proxies for geography, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, political institutions, and property rights institutions. 
Following Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004) and Sachs (2003) we proxy 
geography using a climate variable that measures the percentage of a country's 
land area classified as tropical and subtropical via the Koeppen-Geiger system 
(KG Tropics) and a variable that measures the percentage of a country's land 
area that lies within the geographic tropics (TROPICAR; Gallup, Sachs, and 
Mellinger (1999)). We also include a variable of geographic isolation or the 
degree of landlocked-ness that measures the percentage of a country's land area 
within 100km of an ice-free coast (LCR100KM). To proxy the effect of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization we use two measures due to Alesina et al 
(2003). We include a variable of racial and linguistic characteristics (ethnic 
fractionalization) and a measure of linguistic fractionalization (language). To 
capture tensions between social groups, we also include a measure of ethnic 
tensions from the International Country Risk Guide. Furthermore, we proxy 
political institutions using the average of Freedom House index of political 
rights (see Barro (1991)) while for property rights we use the ratio of 
assassinations to GDP (see Banks (2002)), a measure of the risk of expropriation 
of private investments (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), executive 
constraints (Polity IV), and\ a composite governance index (KKZ96; see Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005)). Finally, we include time dummies and regional 
dummies for East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean 
to account for time and regional heterogeneity, respectively. Please refer to 






4.1 Multiple Regimes and Foreign Aid 
 
We first turn to our sample splitting (TR and BTREED) results. These 
methods require us to pre-specify which growth variables should be treated as 
slope covariates, which as potential threshold variables, and finally which as 
both. We carried out exercises for many alternative specifications. Our aim in 
carrying out these different exercises is to observe two forms of robustness. 
Firstly, we want to see if the trees obtained by TR and BTREED are stable. That 
is, we investigate whether the uncovered tree structures do not vary 
dramatically across specifications when we (1) vary the set of covariates, (2) 
given a set of covariates, vary the choices on which variables should be 
threshold variables, split variables, or both, and (3) vary the number of 
observations in the data due to the inclusion or exclusion of countries because 
of variations in missing values across specifications. And secondly, we want to 
see the extent to which the results obtained by these different sample splitting 
methods --- TR (sequential) and BTREED (non-sequential) --- are in agreement. 
We report results for three specifications --- Baseline, Solow, and 
Parsimonious --- that turned out to be most interesting. The Baseline 
specification is meant to reflect closely the cross-country growth equation in 
the aid literature (see Burnside and Dollar (2000)). The set of slope covariates 
includes the Solow variables (i.e., population growth, investment, schooling, 
and initial income), aid (EDA), macroeconomic policy variables (i.e., openness,   11
inflation, budget surplus, M2), geography (i.e., TROPICAR), linguistic 
fractionalization (language), regional dummies, political institutions 
(political rights), and property rights (assassinations, expropriation risk, 
executive constraints, governance (KKZ96)). The set of threshold variables 
includes most of the slope variables. We do not include in this set the rates of 
human and physical capital accumulation and population growth rates because 
these are period averages and not initial conditions. 
The Solow specification differs from the Baseline specification in that 
the set of covariates only includes the Solow and the Aid variables. Following 
Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Minkin (2001), the idea behind the Solow specification 
is to examine local generalizations of the Solow model in the sense that a Solow 
model applies to each country within a growth regime, but the model's parameters 
vary across regimes.  
Finally, the Parsimonious specification aims to maximize the number of 
observations by excluding the macroeconomic policy variables. Specifically, the 
set of slope covariates includes population growth, investment, schooling, 
initial income, aid, TROPICAR, language, political rights, governance (KKZ96), 
and the three regional dummies. The set of threshold variables for the 
Parsimonious specification comprises TROPICAR, language, political rights, 
givernance (KKZ96), aid, and initial income. 
Figures 2(a)-(c) show the tree diagrams for BTREED for, respectively, the 
Baseline, Solow, and Parsimonious specifications, while Figures 3(a)-(c) show 
the corresponding diagrams for TR. We also report Hansen's 95% confidence bounds 
in Figures 4(a)-(c); these correspond to the TR threshold value estimates in 
Figures 3(a)-(c). While the tree structures generated by TR in Figures 3(a)-(c) 
offer us an interpretable relationship between various growth determinants and 
economic growth, the confidence bounds provide us with a measure of the 
uncertainty over the classification of particular countries into each growth 
regime. The classification of countries into regimes is given, for both BTREED 
and TR and for all three specifications, in Table 4. Where applicable (i.e., in 
the TR cases), a superscript “c” denotes countries within Hansen's 95% 
confidence bounds for the first threshold split as given in Figures 4(a)-(c). 
Finally, the coefficient estimates and standard errors for each of the BTREED 
growth regimes are given in Table 5. The corresponding numbers for the TR growth 
regimes are given in Table 6. 
 
4.1.1 Analysis of Baseline Tree Diagrams 
 
Our Baseline results for BTREED and TR are essentially in agreement. In 
terms of the tree structures, comparing Figure 2(a) with Figure 3(a), we find 
that both BTREED and TR identify two growth regimes defined by ethnolinguistic 
heterogeneity (language). The size of the regimes are roughly equal. We also 
note that the regime with ethnolinguistic heterogeneity falling below the 
threshold value (regime (1)) is initially richer and has a faster rate of per 
capita income growth on average than the regime where ethnolinguisitc 
heterogeneity falls above the threshold value (regime (2)). If we look at the 
country breakdowns for the regimes; please refer to columns 1 and 4 of Table 4, 
we find that the breakdowns are also very similar for both BTREED and TR. Those 
countries for which the two are not in agreement --- i.e., Algeria and Zimbabwe 
--- fall within Hansen's 95% confidence bounds. 
The countries in the high ethnolinguistic fractionalization growth regime 
are predominantly Sub-Saharan African countries (with the key exception of 
Botswana which is classified as belonging to the other regime). On the other 
hand, the low ethnolinguistic fractionalization growth regime is composed mostly 
of Latin American and Caribbean countries (with the exception of Paraguay and 
possibly Guatemala). The countries in Asia, Europe, North Africa, and the Middle 
East have more heterogeneous predicted growth experiences. While most countries   12
in Asia appear to fall in the worse performing (high ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization) regime, some such as Bangladesh, China, South Korea, and 
Papua New Guinea are predicted to fall in the better performing (low 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization) group. Similarly, while most countries in the 
set that we label for convenience as Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East 
are classified as belonging to the better performing (low ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization) regime, there are notable exceptions such as Iran and Israel 
that get placed into the worse performing (high ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization) regime. 
The finding that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is an important driver 
of heterogeneity in growth is consistent with work by Easterly and Levine (1997) 
and Alesina et. al. (2003). Easterly and Levine, in particular, argue that 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization is critically important in accounting for Sub-
Saharan Africa's underdevelopment. Given that the set of countries in this study 
are necessarily confined to the set of developing countries (aid recipients), 
the fact that almost all Sub-Saharan African countries (with the lone and well-
documented exception of Botswana (see, for instance, Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2003))) are separated out in this way and classified under the worse 
performing regime would appear to provide especially strong support for Easterly 
and Levine's hypothesis. 
 
4.1.2 Baseline Parameter Estimates for Multiple Growth Regimes 
 
The evidence on the nature of the growth regimes has important 
implications for the recent debates over the effect of aid on growth. In 
contrast to the current literature, our Baseline results suggest that the effect 
of aid on growth (if any) does not depend on policy variables but rather depends 
on the fundamental determinant, ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Specifically, 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 (for BTREED) and Table 6 (for TR) provide the results 
for the two growth regimes for the respective sample split methods. We find that 
aid has no significant effect for countries in the regime with low 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, but, has a negative and highly significant 
(at the 1% level) effect for countries in the regime with high ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization. Since the countries in the latter regime are, on average, 
initially poorer to begin with, our results suggest that aid is in fact 
potentially counter-productive for this set of countries. Our results therefore 
are consistent with Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004) and Roodman (2004). 
In terms of the coefficient estimates and standard errors for growth 
determinants, the results in Tables 5 and 6 are revealing. For both BTREED and 
TR, we find that the coefficients to  initial per capita income for countries in 
both the high and low ethnolinguistic fractionalization growth regimes are 
highly significant at the 1\% level and negative. A negative coefficient on log 
initial income per capita is typically taken as evidence in the literature that 
poorer countries within the regime are catching up with richer countries in the 
same regime after controlling for other growth factors. Our findings are 
therefore consistent with the interpretation in the literature of “conditional 
convergence” within each of the two growth regimes. In this sense, the findings 
appear to suggest the existence of two convergence clubs defined by 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, where countries within each club are 
converging to a different steady state. 
Both BTREED and TR find that climate (TROPICAR) has a significant negative 
effect on growth for countries in both regimes, while property rights 
institutions (expropriation risk) exhibit a significant positive relationship 
for both regimes. Macroeconomic policies also appear to be important for 
countries in the worse performing (high ethnolinguistic fractionalization) 
regime. For instance, conditional on the other growth determinants, countries 
with higher rates of inflation experience significantly lower growth rates in   13
this regime. Finally, the Solow variables; i.e., population growth, investment, 
and schooling, are all significant and have the correct signs; that is, 
negative, positive, and positive, respectively, for countries in the worse 
performing (high ethnolinguistic fractionalization) regime, although they are 
insignificant for countries in the low ethnolinguistic fractionalization regime. 
In sum, the findings from the Baseline specification, which is meant to 
reflect the literature at large, would appear so far to be stable --- in the 
sense that both BTREED and TR are in agreement --- and reflect the consensus of 
the recent work on the relationship between aid and growth. Nevertheless, we 
would like to go a step further in order to investigate whether the results we 
obtained for the Baseline specification holds when we perturb the exercises a 
bit. We turn now, therefore, to the results for the Solow and Parsimonious 
specifications. 
 
4.1.3 Results from Alternative Specifications 
 
Figures 2(b) and 3(b) show the tree diagrams for BTREED and TR, 
respectively, for the Solow specification. Recall that the only difference 
between the Solow and Baseline specifications is that, except for aid and the 
canonical Solow variables, all other variables that were pre-assigned to be 
slope covariates in the Baseline setup are now assigned to be solely potential 
threshold variables. As can be seen, the tree diagrams for the Solow 
specification are dramatically different from those obtained for the Baseline 
specification. The BTREED tree for the Solow specification is split into two 
regimes. But, now, the threshold variable selected is no longer ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, but inflation. Furthermore, the set of countries within each 
regime also differs dramatically from what we obtained before. There are now 85 
observations in one regime (the low inflation regime) and 13 in the other (the 
high inflation regime) as opposed to 49 for both under the Baseline 
specification. Also, as far as the breakdown of countries into regimes is 
concerned (see column 2 of Table 4), there does not appear to be such a strong 
separation according to geographic regions as we obtained before. Essentially, a 
few countries from each regional grouping with particularly high levels of 
inflation are picked out to form the high inflation regime. Nevertheless, if we 
look at the estimates for the relationship between aid and growth (see columns 4 
and 5 of Table 5), we see that it is (negative but) insignificant from zero for 
both regimes. These results, therefore, should not be taken as evidence to 
support the position that aid may be beneficial to those developing countries 
who are made to implement desirable macroeconomic policies as precondition to 
receiving aid (policy conditionality). 
The situation for TR is worse. As can be seen from Figure 3(b), TR now 
splits the set of countries into five growth regimes according to institutions 
and geography. These are the low-quality institutions regime (regime (1)), the 
medium-quality institutions/less tropical regime (regime (2)), medium-quality 
institutions/more tropical regime (regime (3)), the high-quality 
institutions/less geographically accessible regime (regime (4)), and the high-
quality institutions/more geographically accessible regime ((regime (5)). The 
classification of countries into regimes is therefore not at all similar to what 
was achieved before under the Baseline specification. However, if we consider 
the classification of observations for the Solow specification according to just 
the first split; i.e., according to whether or not expropriation risk for 
countries are above or below the threshold value of 0.455, then, the sample 
splits obtained under TR are somewhat similar to those obtained under BTREED. 
For instance, if we compare the country breakdown for the first regime in TR 
with the second regime in BTREED (i.e., compare columns 2 and 4 of Table 4), we 
see that these are largely similar. Therefore, at least at some level, we find 
that BTREED and TR do agree on the classification of countries into regimes.   14
However, even if we are willing to concede that, we cannot escape from the fact 
that BTREED and TR do not agree on the exact source of heterogeneity. Given the 
same choices for possible threshold variables, BTREED chooses macroeconomic 
policies (i.e., inflation) while TR chooses institutions (expropriation risk). 
It is therefore very difficult to assign a consistent structural interpretation 
to these findings. 
The tree diagrams for the Parsimonious specification bear somewhat better 
news. Recall that the difference between the Parsimonious specification and the 
Baseline and Solow specifications is that for the Parsimonious specification, we 
drop the set of policy variables (except for aid). The reason we did so was to 
attempt to maximize the number of observations in the sample. If we compare the 
TR tree for the Parsimonious specification (Figure 3(c)) with that for the 
Baseline specification (Figure 3(a)), we see that they are identical. However, 
when we carry out the analogous comparison for BTREED (i.e., cf. Figure 2(c) 
with Figure 2(a)), we find that BTREED has selected a single regime (no 
heterogeneity) model for the Parsimonious specification. Hence, yet again, there 
is no clear message from our tree diagrams. 
In other unreported exercises where we consider alternative choices for 
designating variables as threshold, slope, or both for these three 
specifications, we find very little evidence of tree stability. As represented 
by the trees in Figures 2(a)-(c) and 3(a)-(c), we find that the trees we obtain 
tend to (1) vary in size, (2) classify countries quite differently, and (3) 
choose different threshold variables; occasionally by fundamental determinants 
(such as geography, institutions, or ethnolinguistic fractionalization) and 
other times by policy variables (such as aid, inflation, or government budget 
surplus). The instability of the trees obtained under both BTREED and TR renders 
attempts to interpret them structurally to be, unfortunately, precarious. We are 
forced to conclude that there is very little evidence of a robust/reliable 
typology that would relate aid to growth. Another way of putting this is that we 
are severely limited in our ability to engage in tree (model) selection in any 
sensible way. 
Nevertheless, there are some strong regularities in the results across 
specifications (please refer to Tables 5 and 6). We find that the relationship 
between aid and growth tends to be negative with most cases being significant. 
The exception is to be found in the high-quality institutions/less 
geographically accessible regime (regime (4)) for the Solow specification where 
the relationship between aid and growth appears to be positive and highly 
significant. Also, consistent with the larger debate in the growth literature 
over the importance of institutions versus geography to economic performance, we 
find that, at least for the set of developing countries in our sample, both 
these fundamental determinants are important to growth. Climate (TROPICAR) has a 
significant negative effect on growth for countries across specifications and 
regimes with the sole exception of the high ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
regime (regime (2)) for the Parsimonious specification for which its effect is 
also negative but insignificant. Similarly, property rights institutions (as 
measured by expropriation risk and governance (KKZ96)) have a significant 
positive effect on growth for countries in all regimes and for all 
specifications. We also find that conditional convergence holds strongly in the 
growth regression. For almost all regimes across all specifications (the 
exception being regime (2) of the Solow specification), we find the coefficient 
to initial per capita income to be negative and highly significant. 
 
4.2 Robust Relationship between Aid and Growth 
 
These regularities are encouraging because they suggest that even though 
the instability of the trees we obtained implies that finding one that would be 
robust enough to tell a structurally interpretable story about the relationship   15
between aid and growth may be difficult, there may be a way for us nevertheless 
to give policymakers some sense of a “robust” relationship between growth 
determinants of interest, such as aid, and growth. As described in the 
Econometric Methodology section above, we attempt to uncover such robust 
relationships using partial dependency plots generated using the BART algorithm. 
Figure 5(a) shows the partial (i.e., conditioning upon heterogeneity in 
terms of the other covariates) dependency plot of growth on aid for the 
Baseline/Solow set of variables. Similarly, the top left-hand graph in Figure 6 
shows the partial dependency plot of growth on aid for the Parsimonious set of 
variables. We also show the corresponding MCMC posterior 95% confidence bounds 
around the point estimates in both figures. We find that the (partial) 
relationship between growth and international aid is probably not nonlinear, and 
very likely negative. Nevertheless, the posterior 95% confidence bounds do not 
allow us to reject the possibility that the relationship is flat. 
The rest of Figures 5 and 6 show the partial dependence plots for the 
other growth variables and growth for the respective sets of variables (i.e., 
Baseline/Solow and Parsimonious). While some of these partial dependence plots -
-- notably those for ethnolinguistic fractionalization (language) --- are 
suggestive of possible nonlinear relationships, the large posterior 95% 
confidence bounds make it difficult for us to find conclusively in favor of this 
outcome. Taken together with the sample split (i.e., TR and BTREED) results, the 
evidence for a nonlinear relationship between ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
and growth appears to be the strongest amongst the set of regressors. 
Like Figures 2(a) and 3(a) for the Baseline model, the partial dependence 
plots for ethnolinguistic fractionalization suggest that there exists a positive 
relationship between growth and ethnolinguistic fractionalization when the 
degree of fractionalization is low (below approximately 0.45), and a negative 
relationship when the degree of fractionalization is high (above 0.45). 
The plots also show the correct relationships, as suggested by the 
neoclassical growth model, between the Solow variables and growth; i.e., 
negative for population growth, positive for investment and schooling, and 
negative for initial per capita income. They confirm the regularities from the 
TR and BTREED findings that property rights institutions (expropriation risk and 
governance (KKZ96)) have strong positive relationships with growth while climate 
(TROPICAR) has a strong negative relationship. Finally, policies such as trade 
openness and inflation also appear to have (positive and negative, respectively) 





In this paper, we attempt to characterize the relationship between aid and 
growth using recently developed sample splitting methods such as Bayesian tree 
regression (BTREED) and threshold regression (TR). Our aim is to uncover the 
factors that cause divergent effects, if any, of aid on growth for particular 
subsets of countries. We also sought evidence of a nonlinear relationship 
between aid and growth. While our results are suggestive of an interaction 
effect between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and aid --- so that countries 
with levels of ethnolinguistic fractionalization above a threshold value 
experience a negative relationship between aid and growth, while those with 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization below the threshold experience no growth 
effects --- our efforts are severely complicated by the high degree of tree 
instability, and therefore model uncertainty, associated with these sample 
splitting methods. 
A key methodological contribution of our paper therefore is to implement 
in the growth context a strategy for obtaining robust characterizations of the 
aid/growth nexus using model averaging methods such as Bayesian Additive   16
Regression Trees (BART). When we do so, we find no evidence of a nonlinear 
relationship between aid and growth. The relationship between aid and growth is, 
in fact, likely to be negative. Our findings therefore leave us skeptical as to 
any potential positive contributions to growth from increasing foreign aid to 
developing countries. Nevertheless, the evidence from the data is noisy (as seen 
from the large posterior 95% confidence bounds we obtained), and we therefore 
expect the debate over the role of foreign aid in promoting growth to continue. 
An additional caveat to the interpretation of our findings is the problem 
of the endogeneity of aid. The problem of endogeneity is one that is endemic to 
the growth literature. The standard method for getting around endogeneity is to 
use instrumental variables. However, instrumental variables estimation 
procedures for sample splitting methods are scarce and non-existent for the case 
of interest here (i.e., where we have endogeneity in the threshold variables). 
Further, as argued by Brock and Durlauf (2001), the open-ended nature of growth 
theories present difficulties for researchers arguing for the validity of 
instruments on the grounds of predetermination. We therefore suggest that our 
findings, while strongly consistent with recent findings in the literature, be 
interpreted with appropriate caution.   17
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*Schematic due to Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman (2001).
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Figure 2(a)*: Tree Diagram For BTREED Baseline Model
*Note that N gives the number of observations in each node, g stands for the average growth rate in real 
per capita GDP from 1965-94 for countries in the terminal node, and Y is the corresponding average 
level of log initial real per capita GDP in 1965.
N = 49  
g = 0.0162
Y = 8.0672










Figure 2(b)*: Tree Diagram For BTREED Solow Model
*Note that N gives the number of observations in each node, g stands for the average growth rate in real 
per capita GDP from 1965-94 for countries in the terminal node, and Y is the corresponding average 
level of log initial real per capita GDP in 1965.
N = 85 
g = 0.0157
Y = 7.9260
(1)   




Figure 2(c)*: Tree Diagram For BTREED Parsimonious Model
*Note that N gives the number of observations in each node, g stands for the average growth rate in real 
per capita GDP from 1965-94 for countries in the terminal node, and Y is the corresponding average 
level of log initial real per capita GDP in 1965.   
N = 98 








Figure 3(a)*: Tree Diagram For TR Baseline Model
*Note that N gives the number of observations in each node, g stands for the average growth rate in real 
per capita GDP from 1965-94 for countries in the terminal node, and Y is the corresponding average 
level of log initial real per capita GDP in 1965.
N = 52 
g = 0.0160
Y = 8.3335
(1)   
N = 98 












Figure 3(b)*: Tree Diagram For TR Solow Model
*Note that N gives the number of observations in each node, g stands for the average growth rate in real 
per capita GDP from 1965-94 for countries in the terminal node, and Y is the corresponding average 
level of log initial real per capita GDP in 1965.





























≤ 0.561   
N = 123 








Figure 3(c)*: Tree Diagram For TR Parsimonious Model
*Note that N gives the number of observations in each node, g stands for the average growth rate in real 
per capita GDP from 1965-94 for countries in the terminal node, and Y is the corresponding average 
level of log initial real per capita GDP in 1965.
N = 60 
g = 0.0185
Y = 8.3379
(1)   




Threshold Variable         Language 
Threshold Estimate                 0.44720000 




    




Threshold Variable         Expropriation Risk 
Threshold Estimate        0.45538462  








Threshold  Variable  Expropriation  Risk 
Threshold  Estimate  0.66692308   
95% Confidence Interval:  [0.649230, 0.677692] 
    




Threshold  Variable  Landlocked  (LCR100KM) 
Threshold  Estimate  0.38887620   







Threshold Variable    Tropical Area (TROPICAR) 
Threshold  Estimate  0.56140000   
95% Confidence Interval:  [0.561400, 0.561400] 
    




Threshold Variable         Language 
Threshold Estimate                 0.44720000 
95% Confidence Interval:    [0.335800, 0.597500] 
 
 
    





                                                 
ϒ The BART partial dependence diagrams are the same for the Baseline and Solow Models (see Table 3 for model specifications) since both model specifications 
have the same set of variables.    
 Figure 5(b):  Partial Dependence Plots for Solow Variables (Baseline/Solow
ϒ Model) 
 
                                                 
ϒ The BART partial dependence diagrams are the same for the Baseline and Solow Models (see Table 3 for model specifications) since both model specifications 
have the same set of variables.    
Figure 5(c):  Partial Dependence Plots for Macroeconomic Policy and Institutions (Baseline/Solow
ϒ Model) 
 
                                                 
ϒ The BART partial dependence diagrams are the same for the Baseline and Solow Models (see Table 3 for model specifications) since both model specifications 
have the same set of variables.    
Figure 5(d):  Partial Dependence Plots for Other Fundamental Determinants (Baseline/Solow
ϒ Model) 
 
                                                 
ϒ The BART partial dependence diagrams are the same for the Baseline and Solow Models (see Table 3 for model specifications) since both model specifications 
have the same set of variables.    




                                                 
ϒ Please see Table 3 for model specification.    
Table 1: Data Description 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION PANEL SOURCE










Investment logarithm of average investments/gdp 1965-79, 1980-94 PWT61
Schooling logarithm of average years of male secondary and higher school attainment 1965, 1980 Barro-Lee(2000)
Initial Income log of initial per capita income 1965, 1980 PWT61
KG Tropics
Percentage of land area classified as tropical and subtropical via the 
Koeppen-Geiger system. 
CID, Harvard University 
Landlocked 
(LCR100KM)
Percentage of a country’s land area within 100km of an ice- free coast.   CID, Harvard University 
Tropical Area 
(TROPICAR)
Fraction of land area in geographic tropics. Gallup and Sachs, 1999
Language
Measure of linguistic fractionalization based on data describing
 shares of languages spoken as “mother tongues”.
Alesina, A., A. 
Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, 




Measure of ethnic fractionalization based on racial and linguistic characteristics. 
Alesina, A., A. 
Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, 
S. Kurlat, and R. Wacziarg 
(2003)
Ethnic Tension
This variable, which has been transformed to lie between 0 to 1, “measures the degree 
of tension within a country attributable to racial, nationality, or language divisions.” 
Higher values correspond to lower degrees of ethnic tension. We take the average 
value of Ethnic Tension for the available data (1982-94) and repeat in each period. 
1982-1994
International Country Risk 
Guide 
Political Rights
Political Rights.  The variable was tranformed using ( 7-x)/6 so that lower ratings (closer 
to zero) are given to countries with poor political rights and higher ratings (closer to 
one) are given to countries with better political rights.
1972-79, 1980-94 Freedom House 2005   
Table 1 (cont.): Data Description 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION PANEL SOURCE
Assassinations Assassinations per capita 1965-79, 1980-94 Banks (2002)
Executive 
Constraints
Rescaled, from 0 to 1, with a higher score indicating more constraint:
0 indicates unlimited authority; score of 1 indicates executive parity or subordination. 
We calculated the average for each period.  
1965-79, 1980-94 Polity IV dataset 
Expropriation 
Risk
Risk of “outright confiscation and forced nationalization" of property. 




Composite Governance index. It is calculated as the average of six variables: voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.
1996, 1996
Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2005)
Aid Effective Development Assistance/ real GDP 1970-79, 1980-94 Roodman (2004)
Budget Surplus Budget surplus 1965-79, 1980-94 Roodman (2004)
Inflation ln(1+ inflation rate) 1965-79, 1980-94
Global Development Network 
Growth Database.
M2 Average Ratio of  M2 to GDP  1965-79, 1980-94
Global Development Network 
Growth Database.
Openness Average openness measure proposed by Sachs and Warner 1965-79, 1980-94
Sachs and Warner, 1995;
Easterly et al., 2004; Wacziarg 
and Welch, 2002
East Asia A dummy variable for East Asia
Latin America & 
Caribbean
A dummy variable for Latin America
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
A dummy variable for Sub-Saharan Africa
 
 
    
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Min. Max. Median Mean Std. Dev.
KG Tropics 0.000 1.000 0.656 0.547 0.400
Landlocked (LCR100KM) 0.000 1.000 0.363 0.433 0.349
Tropical Area (TROPICAR) 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.689 0.432
Language 0.003 0.923 0.427 0.418 0.320
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.039 0.930 0.540 0.507 0.235
Ethnic Tension 0.131 1.000 0.587 0.570 0.241
Political Rights 0.000 1.000 0.417 0.484 0.278
Assassinations 0.000 4.000 0.067 0.373 0.722
Executive Constraints 0.000 1.000 0.389 0.471 0.328
Expropriation Risk 0.346 0.883 0.613 0.614 0.120
Governance (KKZ96) -1.869 1.159 -0.270 -0.195 0.589
East Asia 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.092 0.290
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.214 0.412
Latin America & Caribbean 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.245 0.432
M2 0.073 1.001 0.225 0.278 0.153
Budget Surplus -0.206 0.092 -0.033 -0.039 0.040
Inflation 0.031 3.127 0.119 0.320 0.587
Openness 0.000 1.000 0.067 0.255 0.339
Aid -0.328 9.482 0.495 1.316 1.823
Population Growth -3.059 -2.365 -2.580 -2.602 0.111
Investment 0.698 3.563 2.568 2.501 0.520
Schooling -4.017 1.226 -0.298 -0.489 0.936
Initial Income 6.094 9.344 7.906 7.843 0.742
Growth -0.053 0.081 0.014 0.014 0.024
 
    
Table 3
◊: Model Specifications 
 
 
Slope Threshold Slope Threshold Slope Threshold
1 KG Tropics XX - -
2 Landlocked (LCR100KM) XX - -
3 Tropical Area (TROPICAR) XX XX X
4 Language XX XX X
5 Ethnic Fractionalization XX - -
6 Ethnic Tension XX - -
7 Political Rights XX X X
8 Assassinations XX X- -
9 Executive Constraints XX - -
10 Expropriation Risk XX X- -
11 Governance (KKZ96) XX X X
12 East Asia XX X
13 Sub-Saharan Africa XX X
14 Latin America & Caribbean XX X
15 M2 XX X- -
16 Budget Surplus XX X- -
17 Inflation XX X- -
18 Openness XX X- -
19 Aid XXXXX X
20 Population Growth XXX
21 Investment XXX
22 Schooling XXX
23 Initial Income XXXXX X
24 Dummy 1980-94 XXX
Number of obs.
Baseline Exercise Solow Exercise Parsimonious Exercise
98 98 123
 
                                                 
◊ This Table describes the set of variables in the model space for each of the three specifications – Baseline, 
Solow, and Parsimonious. An “X” means that a variable was designated either to be a potential threshold 
variable, or a slope covariate (or, as the case may be, both). An “-” means that that variable was dropped 
from the model space.    
Table 4
∇: Country Breakdowns by Growth Regimes for BTREED and TR Models 
 
 
  BTREED  TR 
Country    Baseline  Solow  Pars.  Baseline Solow Pars. 
                    
Africa                   
                   
Benin 
-  -  1 
-  - 2 
Botswana  1  1  1  1
c 4  1
c 
Cameroon  2  1  1  2 3  2 
Central African Rep.  -  -  1  - -  2 
Congo, Rep.  2  1  1  2 1  2 
Gambia  2  1  1  2 5  2 
Ghana  2  1  1  2 3  2 
Kenya  2  1  1  2 3  2 
Lesotho  -  -  1  - -  1 
Malawi  2  1  1  2 3  2 
Mali  2  1  1  2 1  2 
Mauritius   -  -  1  - -  2
c 
Mozambique  -  -  1  - -  2 
Niger  2  1  1  2 3  2 
Senegal  2  1  1  2 3  2 
Sierra Leone  2  1  1  2 3  2 
South Africa  2  1  1  2 4  2 
Togo  2  1  1  2 3  2 
Uganda   2  2  1  2 1  2 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  2  2  1  2 1  2 
Zambia  2  2  1  2 3  2 
Zimbabwe   2  1  1  1
c 3  2
c 
             
             
Asia              
            
Bangladesh  1  1  1  1 2  1 
China  1  1  1  1 4  1 
India  2  1  1  2 4  2 
Indonesia  2  1/2  1  2 5  2 
Korea, Rep. of  1  1  1  1 5  1 
Malaysia  2  1  1  2 5  2
c 
Nepal  -  -  1  - -  2 
Pakistan  2  1  1  2 2  2 
Papua New Guinea  1  1  1  1 5  1
c 
Philippines  2  1  1  2 3  2 
Singapore  -  -  1  - -  1
c 
Sri Lanka  2  1  1  2 3  2
c 
Thailand  2  1  1  2
c 4  2 
             
 
                                                 
∇ A superscript “c” denotes countries within Hansen’s 95% CI bound for the first threshold split as given in 
Figures 4(a)-(c). “1/2” indicates that a country was in one regime in one time period and another in the 
other.    
Table 4




  BTREED  TR 
Country   Baseline  Solow  Pars.  Baseline Solow Pars. 
                    
Latin America & the Caribbean                    
                    
Argentina  1  2  1  1 2  1 
Bolivia  1  1/2  1  1 3  1 
Brazil  1  2  1  1 4  1 
Chile  1  2  1  1 5  1 
Colombia  1  1  1  1 4  1 
Costa Rica  1  1  1  1 3  1 
Dominican Republic  1  1  1  1 3  1 
Ecuador  1  1  1  1 3  1 
Guatemala  2  1  1  2
c 1  2
c 
Honduras  1  1  1  1 3  1 
Jamaica  1  1  1  1 3  1 
Mexico  1  1  1  1 4  1 
Nicaragua  1  2  1  1 1
c 1 
Panama  -  -  1  - -  1
c 
Paraguay  2  1  1  2 2  2
c 
Peru  1  2  1  1 3  1
c 
Trinidad & Tobago  1  1  1  1 5  1 
Uruguay  1  1  1  1 2  1 
Venezuela  1  1  1  1 3  1 
                    
                    
Europe, North Africa, & Middle 
East                   
                   
Algeria   2  1  1  1
c 2  1
c 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1  1  1  1 2  1 
Hungary  1  1  1  1 5  1 
Iran  2  1  1  2 1  2 
Israel  2  2  1  2 5  2
c 
Jordan  1  1  1  1 2  1 
Poland  1  2  1  1 5  1 
Syrian Arab Rep.  1  1  1  1 2  1 
Tunisia  1  1  1  1 2  1 
Turkey  1  1  1  1 4  1 
            
                                                 
∇ A superscript “c” denotes countries within Hansen’s 95% CI bound for the first threshold split as given in 
Figures 4(a)-(c). “1/2” indicates that a country was in one regime in one time period and another in the 
other.    
Table 5
+: BTREED Coefficient Estimates for Growth Regimes 
 
 
  Baseline  Solow  Parsimonious 
   (1)  (2)  (1) (2)  (1) 




















































































































































































































          
Number of obs.  49  49  85 13  123 
 
                                                 
+ Dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita across, respectively, the periods 1965-79 and 1980-
94. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model specifications are described in Table 3. “***” indicates significance at 
the 1% level while “**” indicates significance at the 5% level and “*” at the 10% level.    
Table 6
+: TR Coefficient Estimates for Growth Regimes 
 
 
  Baseline  Solow 
   (1)  (2)  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) 










































































































































































































































































































             
Number of 
obs.  52  46  11 16  38 15  18 
 
                                                 
+ Dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita across, respectively, the periods 1965-79 and 1980-
94. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model specifications are described in Table 3. “***” indicates significance at 
the 1% level while “**” indicates significance at the 5% level and “*” at the 10% level.     
Table 6
+ (cont.): TR Coefficient Estimates for Growth Regimes 
 
 
  Parsimonious 
   (1)  (2) 




























































































     
Number of obs.  60  63 
 
                                                 
+ Dependent variable is the growth rate of real GDP per capita across, respectively, the periods 1965-79 and 1980-
94. White standard errors are in parentheses. Model specifications are described in Table 3. “***” indicates 
significance at the 1% level while “**” indicates significance at the 5% level and “*” at the 10% level.  